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CRITICAL THEORY AND THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT'S
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Jose E. ALVAREZ*
The application of critical race insights to issues involving
U.S. foreign relations is likely to benefit both international law-
yers and traditional race critics, albeit for different reasons. In
critical race theory, international lawyers will find liberation
from the prevailing state-centric and positivist modes of analysis
that now dominate our field. Traditional race critics, who have
usually stopped at the water's edge,1 may discover that U.S. for-
eign policy decisions replicate some of the familiar patterns of
many domestic U.S. laws. Race critics may find it illuminating
that what the U.S. government does, by way of treaty, serves to
entrench or even exacerbate racial and ethnic divides within
other nations-as well as within our own.
I will limit my remarks to an examination of the North
American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) Chapter Eleven
governing foreign direct investment (FDI).
2 NAFTA's invest-
ment chapter is a direct descendant of the U.S. model bilateral
* Professor of law, University of Michigan School of Law. Speech presented at His-
panic National Bar Association annual conference in Miami, Florida on October 4, 1996.
1. Adrien Wing is one of the rare counter-examples. See, e.g., Adrien Katherine
Wing, Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black America, 25
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1993).
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
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investment treaty as well as the nearly 900 similar bilateral in-
vestment treaties that now exist throughout the world.3 At the
same time, the NAFTA investment chapter is a much strength-
ened version of prior U.S. bilateral investment treaties as well as
bilateral investment treaties now in force between other coun-
tries; it is, in many ways, a U.S. bilateral investment treaty on
steroids-a dream come true for the U.S. foreign investor.4 The
NAFTA investment chapter is also significant as it is likely to
represent the starting position for U.S. negotiators in other fo-
rums addressing FDI issues. Absent a radical shift in the U.S.
approach to foreign investment, it is likely that our government
will seek the replication of the NAFTA investment provisions
through a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Agreement for the
Americas or through global arrangements within the Organiza-
tion of Economic Cooperation and Development or the World
Trade Organization. 5
The rhetorical power of the NAFTA investment chapter-its
perceived legitimacy among traditional international lawyers-
needs to be compared to some troublesome realities on the
ground. The rhetoric of the NAFTA investment chapter is that
of scrupulous neutrality and equal protection. Its text is
grounded in symmetrical and reciprocal rights as between the
NAFTA parties and their investors. This befits the treaty's
claim that it is a "fair" contract between "sovereign equals." The
reality is quite different. There is no actual symmetry of direct
benefits to the national investors of all three NAFTA parties-at
least not for the foreseeable future. As few Mexican investors
are likely to be in the position to penetrate the U.S. market, it is
almost exclusively U.S., not Mexican, nationals that get the
benefit of the investment chapter. In reality, U.S. firms, not
3. For a summary of bilateral investment treaties, see RUDOLF DOLZER, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995).
4. For a summary of the achievements of the NAFTA investment chapter com-
pared to prior U.S. investment agreements, see Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the
NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor.State Dispute Settlement, 27
INT'L LAW. 727 (1993).
5. On the prospects for a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas, see Summit of
the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 808
(1995); Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal
Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539 (1995). For discussion of the possibilities for a Multilat-
eral Investment Agreement, see Christopher N. Camponovo, Dispute Settlement and the




Mexican companies, will be demanding national and most-
favored-nation treatment; they, not Mexican firms, will be the
ones relying on the NAFTA to renege on their prior promises to
litigate in local courts; they, not small- or medium-sized Mexican
firms, will be reaching for supposedly "impartial" international
arbitration to resolve investor-state disputes; they, not Mexican
nationals, will be able to challenge local ordinances as de facto
confiscatory measures or as breaches of the NAFTA prohibition
on performance requirements. U.S. firms will be the ones
claiming the direct benefits of free unencumbered repatriation of
profits. Thanks to guaranteed arbitration, U.S. multinationals,
who have been largely responsible for the promulgation and en-
trenchment of the doctrine of state responsibility to aliens, will
henceforth be in a strengthened position to claim the benefits of
that doctrine as well as the growing body of "lex mercatoria" so
favorable to their interests.
The rhetoric of the NAFTA investment chapter suggests that
all three NAFTA parties assume the "same" duties and take the
same risks. The reality is a world in which U.S. laws and risk-
taking remain essentially the same while Mexican policymakers
are expected to complete and institutionalize an economic revo-
lution without the resources needed to alleviate the inevitable
adjustment pains. The predictable consequences of investment
liberalization within Mexico were scarcely considered, much less
addressed, by the negotiators of the investment chapter. The
social, cultural, and political costs of investment liberalization
were not factored into the economists' models that produced this
treaty.6 Yet, in the unmodelled real world, the Mexican people,
especially those on the bottom of Mexican society, are now facing
severe economic dislocations, which range from sectorial unem-
ployment to a rising tide of bankruptcies for small- and medium-
sized Mexican firms. For now, what the vast majority of the
Mexican population has witnessed are the social costs of invest-
ment liberalization and not its presumed longer term benefits.
7
Moreover, even over the longer term, when the presumptive
positive effects of the theory of comparative advantage are to
6. Cf. Robert W. Benson, Free Trade as an Extremist Ideology: The Case of
NAFTA, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 555 (1994).
7. For an overview of some of these consequences, see Alejandro Nadal, Mexico:
Open Economy, Closed Options (working paper on file with author); Elvia A. Quintana
Adriano, The North American Free Trade Agreement and its Impact on the Micro-, Small.
and Medium-Sized Mexican Industries, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 967 (1995).
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emerge, investment liberalization will produce a Mexican econ-
omy increasingly dominated by multinationals from one coun-
try-the United States. Few have asked what the political con-
sequences of such domination are likely to be for a country whose
history, as Amy Chua has most recently reminded us, consists of
repeated oscillations between periods of market openness punc-
tuated by cycles of reaction and nationalization.8 After all, this
is a country whose history consists of cycles of often violent re-
actions to domination by "ugly anglos" intent on achieving their"manifest destiny."9 Why are we content to assume that this
fifth Mexican oscillation-this time in favor of the market-will
be permanent or constitute the end of Mexico's history?
The economic models that produced the NAFTA invest-
ment chapter focus on Mexican GNP, not equity. 10 Even assum-
ing that the sanguine estimates of economists prove correct with
respect to the growth of the Mexican economy as a whole, no one
knows whether the widening gap between Mexican elites and the
desperately poor, along racial and ethnic lines, will only be exac-
erbated by FDI nor what the resulting social and political costs
will be if the gap increases. Furthermore, investment liberali-
zation, NAFTA-style, has been pursued without regard for the
need to legitimize FDI to the Mexican people, and not merely to
those in Chiapas. In Mexico and elsewhere, investment liberali-
zation has been pursued without a vision of social justice, with-
out real democratic legitimacy, and without concern for the his-
torical record of FDI. NAFTA negotiators from all sides pre-
tended that free trade and free investment were interchangeable
phenomena-as if the import of a Sony television and the sale to
a foreign investor of a treasured cultural icon are as indistin-
guishable politically as they are under economic theory. 1 Many
8. See Amy Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995).
9. Id. at 228-38.
10. See generally John Whalley & Colleen Hamilton, The Intellectual Underpin-
nings o North American Economic Integration, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 43 (1995). See
also Calvin D. Siebert & Mahmood A. Zaidi, Employment, Trade and Foreign Investment
Effects of NAFTA, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333 (1996).
11. For examples of the fears prompted by and repercussions of incoming FDI, see
EARL H. FRY, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (1983). See also Gloria L.
Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A
Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSN'L L. 259 (1994); Christopher K Dalrymple,
Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
and the Calvo Clause, 29 CORNELL INVL L.J. 161 (1996).
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real world effects of incoming FDI flows were not addressed, at
least not for Mexico. 12
No one engaged in story-telling about foreign investors of
old; instead, the rhetoric of the NAFTA investment chapter sug-
gests that all foreign investors, regardless of their bargaining
power or the histories of particular companies, are all
"innocents" abroad, equally needful of protection from all-
powerful government interests bent on their destruction.
s In-
stead of addressing the likely consequences of a tide of FDI in
the 1990s and beyond, U.S. negotiators insisted on using the
NAFTA investment chapter to address the concerns of the Cold
War. Instead of looking forward, Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA
looks back: it insists on protecting foreign investors from the last
wave of Third World nationalizations, without much attention to
the factors that produced those waves or the possible backlash
that may accompany future incoming FDI flows.
The rhetoric of the investment chapter suggests a narrow
economic treaty dealing with a limited set of protections for a
defined group. The drafters of the NAFTA, as well as the com-
mentators who have addressed it, tend to see it as a treaty
within the self-contained sphere of "private" international law
or, even more narrowly, "international economic law." In reality,
this is a treaty that has an impact on the civil, political, eco-
nomic, and social rights of a variety of individuals-from na-
tional investors driven out of business to those employed and un-
employed by the changing fortunes and preferences of foreign
multinational enterprises, especially in those sectors of the
Mexican economy most likely to be dominated by foreign inves-
tors such as commercial agriculture and export manufacturing.
But, if viewed as the human rights treaty that, in fact, it is, the
NAFTA investment chapter is the most bizarre human rights
treaty ever conceived.
Under the NAFTA investment chapter, corporate and natu-
ral investors have gained direct access to binding denationalized
adjudication of any governmental measure that interferes with
their ample rights. Many of the NAFTA investor protections
12. Cf. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, U.S.-
Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M. 1499. The labor side agreement emerged from concerns within the
United States that its laws relating to these issues would be disregarded or avoided.





echo human rights contained in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the principal human rights coventions, in-
cluding rights against discrimination, to security, to recognition
as a legal person, to nationality, to freedom of movement, and to
own property and not be arbitrarily deprived of it. 14 Interest-
ingly, the United States has only managed to agree on such a po-
tentially effective regime for human rights enforcement in the
context of one type of legal person, the foreign investor, and not
for any other human being. 15
Seen from this perspective, the NAFTA investment chapter
is a human rights treaty for a special-interest group. Except for
relatively weak side agreements, which deal with environmental
and labor issues, this is a treaty that is effectively silent with re-
spect to the rights of others, who may be affected by FDI flows,
and that ignores many of the other rights also contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human rights. In the chapter protect-
ing the rights of businesses, there is no mention of a human be-
ing's right to "economic" rights "indispensable for ... dignity and
the free development of ... personality."'16 Similarly, there is no
mention of a right to work, of free choice of employment, of just
and favorable conditions of work, or of protection against unem-
ployment. Neither is there mention of rights of "equal pay for
equal work" and "just and favourable remuneration ensuring ...
an existence worthy of human dignity," or of the "right to form
and to join trade unions."' 7 No one, not even the foreign inves-
tor's employees, are given enforceable rights to "rest and leisure,
including reasonable limitations of working hours and periodic
holidays with pay."'8 No one is given a right to an "adequate"
standard of living19 or a "right to education,"20 and, of course,
there is no discussion of a "social and international order" in
14. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. Doc. A1810
at arts. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17, and 27(2) (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
15. The category of "foreign investor" that the investment chapter singles out for
special treatment tends to render others, including national investors, invisible. It also
focuses on only one aspect of the foreign investor-nationality-at the expense of the
whole, including the history of the sector in which the foreign investor plans to invest or
the history of the multinational corporation. Cf. Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D.
Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTIMNG EDGE 573, 578 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
16. Universal Declaration, supra note 14, art. 22.
17. Id. art. 23.
18. Id. art. 24.
19. Id. art. 25(1).
20. Id. art. 26.
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which all of these human rights can be fully realized for all per-
sons, not merely foreign investors.2' What is perhaps most
striking in a treaty whose essential goal is economic develop-
ment is that there is no attempt to connect the rights it so lav-
ishly bestows on its investors to the needs of the collective; there
is no real attempt to put flesh on concepts such as a "right to de-
velopment" or "sustainable development.
22
It might be said that the comparison between the NAFTA
and human rights instruments is, in itself, a rhetorical stance
that is as questionable as the NAFTA's invocation of "equal
rights." Nonetheless, the idea that NAFTA advocates would find
comparisons with human rights instruments inapposite or ab-
surd, at a minimum, shows the limited frame of reference in
which that treaty was negotiated.
Furthermore, the NAFTA investment chapter does not pur-
port to impose any corresponding duties on the U.S. multina-
tionals it privileges. The NAFTA chapter contains scarcely one
word about the many duties that multinationals should owe host
states under international law. These duties have been can-
vassed, for example, in the Draft Code on the Conduct of Trans-
national Corporations, which has been under discussion at the
United Nations for years. 23 There is no mention of duties to re-
spect the national sovereignty of the states in which they oper-
ate; to contribute towards the achievement of national economic
goals and development objectives; to implement contracts in good
faith and to renegotiate contracts subject to a fundamental
change in circumstances; to adhere to socio-cultural objectives
and values; to respect human rights; to abstain from corrupt
practices; to cooperate in the allocation of decisionmaking powers
among their entities such as to enable them to contribute to eco-
nomic development, local equity participation, and the manage-
21. Cf. id. art. 28. Of course, it does not need to be said that the NAFTA invest-
ment chapter does not attempt to lend its considerable legitimacy and enforcement tools
to making real the promises contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1967).
22. "Sustainable development" includes the concept that economic growth and envi-
ronmental protection are neither discrete nor inherently contradictory goals, but are
structurally related and may be mutually supportive. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott,
"International Economic Law". Implications for Scholarship, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
505, 509 (1996).
23. See Daniel B. Magraw, United Nations ECOSOC Draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, in BASIC DOCUMENTS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 533,
541 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990).
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rial and technical training of nationals; and to give priority to
the employ of nationals. Moreover, there is no mention of duties
to avoid transfer pricing practices, which have the effect of modi-
fying the tax base on which their entities are assessed or of
evading exchange control measures; to cooperate with host
state's transfer of technology goals; to perform their activities
with due regard to relevant international standards of consumer
protection; and to disclose financial information. 24 While many
of these duties are not regarded as controversial in the abstract,
the prospect of making them as enforceable as the rights recog-
nized in the NAFTA would have seemed heretical to NAFTA ne-
gotiators.
The bottom line is that instead of the comprehensive, bal-
anced, and truly reciprocal investment regime that it purports to
be, the NAFTA investment chapter is merely a short-sighted,
one-way ratchet to reward and attract U.S. capital. Even those
who assume that the attraction of foreign capital provides its
own reward ought to be concerned should this treaty's imbal-
ances undermine its promise to supply stable and enduring
rights for foreign investors.
But if the investment chapter is not as color-, class-, and
ethnicity-blind as its rhetoric suggests, are there consequences
for Latinos within the United States as well? Others have al-
ready suggested the possibility that racial and ethnic minorities
within the United States are likely to experience a dispropor-
tionate share of any adverse environmental and labor effects of
that treaty and I need not dwell on that possibility here. 25 I
would suggest that race critics explore another question as well:
namely, the possible connections between FDI flows and immi-
gration flows into the United States.
NAFTA's proponents argue that FDI flows into Mexico will
reduce the pressures on Mexicans to emigrate. 26 Those who have
examined the history of FDI flows and their impact on U.S. im-
24. Id. See also Jos6 E. Alvarez, Remarks, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 532, 550 (1992).
25. See, e.g., Xavier Carlos Vasquez, The North American Free Trade Agreement
and Environmental Racism, 34 HARV. J. IN'L L. 357, 367 (1993)(arguing Mexican-
Americans are most likely to be affected by NAFTA-induced environmental racism).
26. See, e.g., Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The North American Free Trade
Agreement: Its Major Provisions, Economic Benefits, and Overarching Implications, in
NAFTA: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS
1, 12-13 (Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer eds., 1994).
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migration, such as Saskia Sassen, would suggest otherwise
2 7
Sassen argues that U.S. investments abroad actually encourage
greater emigration to the United States through:
(a) the incorporation of new segments of the population into
wage labor and the associated disruption of traditional work
structures both of which create a supply of migrant workers;
(b) the feminization of the new industrial workforce and its
impact on the work opportunities of men, both in the new in-
dustrial zones and in the traditional work structures; and
(c) the consolidation of objective and ideological links with the
highly industrialized countries where most foreign capital
originates, links that involve both a generalized westerniza-
tion effect and more specific work situations wherein workers
find themselves producing goods for people and firms in the
highly industrialized countries.
28
If Sassen is correct and FDI encourages Mexican immigra-
tion, the NAFTA investment chapter is directly implicated in
many of the core issues that now preoccupy LatCrit theorists, as
much of their work-consisting of critiques of initiatives such as
English-only statutes or proposals to deny government benefits
to legal and illegal aliens-address the backlash to immigration.
The NAFTA investment chapter may have a causal link to pro-
posals that pose risks to the rights of all Latinos, legal and ille-
gal, within the United States. Moreover, if FDI promotes Mexi-
can immigration, it is yet one more reason why Mexican
immigration cannot, morally, be seen as "Mexico's" problem. If
its investors help create the plight of Mexican immigrants, the
United States is morally obligated to do more than simply build
"fortress America" in reaction.
There are many other promising avenues of inquiry that
race critics might pursue in connection with the NAFTA invest-
27. SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL (1988).
28. Id. at 120.
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ment chapter. Some of these may clarify the past. Critical race
perspectives may have much to say about how the NAFTA in-
vestment chapter came about. They may help explain the
"naive" faith of its negotiators in facially neutral rules and fo-
rums that ignore North/South power differentials. Critical in-
sights may pose issues for the future, suggesting, for example,
that there are risks should FDI flows encourage the
"harmonization" of laws between sending and receiving coun-
tries. 29 While many have assumed that such harmonization is
desirable, race critics may not be quite as sanguine, especially if
harmonization should proceed, as has investment liberalization,
on U.S. terms.
Once we use critical insights to "deconstruct" and
"reconstruct" the NAFTA investment chapter, we may become
aware that investment liberalization, NAFTA-style, is not what
it appears to be: a manifestation of neutral or impersonal
"market" forces. We may realize just how much the NAFTA in-
vestment chapter reflects U.S. laws and perspectives.
At the same time, it is important that race critics not be
seen as mere naysayers. The challenge for race critics, as well as
other critics of the NAFTA, is to help construct alternative mod-
els for "sustainable investment liberalization." As the United
States strives for hemisphere-wide investment liberalization
through a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas, or even
globally, through negotiations in the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development and the World Trade Organiza-
tion, race critics may usefully remind government negotiators of
the need to keep investment liberalization responsive to the des-
perate plight of the underclass in both FDI sending and receiving
states as only this kind of liberalization is likely to survive the
pressures of representative government. What everyone, on both
sides of the North/South divide, should want are investment
rules of the road that endure because they are perceived as, and
are, fair.
29. For one examination of integrative possibilities, see Frederick M. Abbott, Inte-
gration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the
GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917 (1992).
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